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The Implications and Imperfections of Practice 
Kirsten Ainley 
 
This special issue on Human Rights as Ideal and Practical Politics brings to the fore 
the significant ways that our study, practice and understanding of human rights have 
developed since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in December 1948. These articles incite us to look beyond theories 
of human rights which accept rights as static and activists as unreflective workers 
towards an uncontested ideal. Instead, they show rights to be a dynamic, political, 
potentially (still) radical concept that shifts in meaning between historical contexts 
and in the hands of the various players in the human rights field. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, the idea for this section began with a panel at the 2010 
International Studies Association conference, at which we discussed whether and how 
theorists and activists could be brought closer together. Despite the focus of this 
section having changed from theorists and activists to ideal and practical politics, 
some of the same assumptions about the need to probe the relationship between these 
actors remain. A number of interesting points came out of the ISA discussion, the 
most important being the question of whether it is a wise idea to bring these two 
groups into closer proximity in the first place. It is certainly fashionable in these cash-
strapped times when academics are being asked to ensure that their work has ‘impact’ 
in the ‘real world’. So the benefit to theorists of a closer engagement is quite clear – a 
better understanding of how human rights are actually fought for and achieved (if this 
is something that interests them), plus the possibility of being looked at more 
favourably by funding councils. There is also likely to be (and I’ll come to this later) a 
more general benefit to theorising from engagement in practice. But is there any 
benefit to the activist? Or does theory tend to threaten more than bolster activism?  
 
I argued then as I do now that the practices of theorising about human rights and 
‘doing’ human rights, while they may at times be undertaken by the same agents, have 
different logics and incommensurable goals. Theory and practice are not 
dichotomous, but theory and activism are analytically separable (usefully so, as 
shown by Joe Hoover and Marta Iñiguez de Heredia and by Robin Redhead and Nick 
Turnbull) and by thinking about them as different practices we can see that the activist 
is more likely to be threatened by theory than the theorist by activism. Professional 
theorists are (rightly or wrongly) paid to be uncertain – to probe the boundaries of 
concepts, to find inconsistencies, to undermine and to expose – as Jenna Reinbold 
demonstrates in her depiction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
foundationless political mythmaking. The conviction of the converted is of interest to 
theorists, but unlikely in and of itself to affect their own uncertainty. Activists, on the 
other hand, require a level of certainty in order to act, particularly if they are to justify 
violent action towards achieving human rights goals, and are therefore susceptible to 
their activism being suffocated by doubt. Any benefit to the activist of being brought 
closer to the theorist is to be found in increasing certainty (assuming, as many do, that 
eventually theorists of human rights will reach agreement about what these universal 
rights are and how they should be defended). Yet the output of human rights 
theorising so far seems too tentative, too diverse, too fractious to be of benefit to 
activism – and the articles in this section give little reason to think that this will 
change. 
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The contributors do not see activists and theorists as separate groups, or perhaps even 
as participating in separate practices. Brooke Ackerly suggests that activists should 
also be theorists (or should at least engage in serious critical reflection on their 
activism). Redhead and Turnbull argue that many activists are also theorists, just as 
many theorists are also activists, and as such do not seem to experience the 
contradictions in purpose outlined above (although Redhead and Turnbull’s research 
did not explicitly investigate this). Certainly it is the case that many activists do 
critically reflect upon their work and are fully cognisant of the latest theoretical 
statements on human rights. So is the link closer and more beneficial than I have 
intimated? Actors who see themselves as both theorists and activists may use the 
uncertainty of theory in order to critique and develop their conception of human rights 
and how to achieve rights goals, and in their activism they will almost certainly 
encounter uncertainty. But my sense from reading accounts of Redhead and 
Turnbull’s interviewees is that their reflection does not extend all the way down to 
first principles about whether the rights they fight for exist – and neither should it if 
we expect them to continue their fight (though we may, following Hoover and Iñiguez 
de Heredia, want them to question the power structures that their activism takes place 
within and contributes to sustaining). These theorist-activists may question whether 
rights are being achieved in the most effective manner, or whether the correct rights 
or target populations are being prioritised at any given time, but to question the 
existence of rights themselves would surely disqualify them from the role of human 
rights activist. The goal of the activist remains concrete action and attainment borne 
of conviction – a conviction the theorist must reject as part of the practice of 
contemporary academia. For human rights organisations, the mark of success in a 
campaign is often the writing into law of particular rights – precisely to limit the 
scope of uncertainty around rights claims or permissible challenges to them. Put more 
strongly still, for many supporters of the idea of human rights, the function of such 
rights as fixed kernels of moral truth is to limit the power plays and contingencies of 
politics, and the sprawl of disengaged theorising. Within the practice of human rights 
activism, to question publically the very existence of these rights is close to 
sacrilegious, for reasons well-described by Reinbold. Theory, in its guise here of 
‘ideal politics’, may be used to justify a destination point and route/s to get there, but 
not to put the journey itself in jeopardy.  
 
But what of the practical politics that the contributors to a large extent focus upon? 
All of the articles here complicate, quite rightly, assumptions made in conventional 
studies of human rights, and challenge us to understand the rights movement and its 
principal actors in new ways. I support this endeavour wholeheartedly, particularly 
the focus on what is actually done in the name of human rights and how this is 
justified in amongst the cacophony of political demands made in particular times and 
places. But in mounting their challenge, the articles suggest a number of new 
questions (and some old ones) that must be asked if we are to engage substantively 
with the ‘practical politics’ of human rights.   
 
The first question raised, or perhaps more accurately, not avoided, is an old one: what 
are rights? The approaches exemplified in the preceding articles use sociology and 
history more than philosophy to understand rights, and it is perhaps inevitable that 
these literatures will lead to differing views about what rights are. The authors of the 
articles in this section seem to disagree both about what rights are generally and about 
what they are at any given point in time, even if they do largely agree about how we 
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can know either of these things. Ackerly argues that reflection alone cannot establish 
what rights are – only understanding the practices that promote and sustain the 
enjoyment of rights can lead us to know what rights are, suggesting, alongside Hoover 
and Iñiguez de Heredia, that rights vary across contexts. Yet Ackerly also sets out 
some significant and contested features of rights within her article which suggest a 
much more fixed or universal view of rights. Rights are presented as necessarily 
commensurate with each other – indivisible and interrelated – but there is no reason to 
think that they will be if we follow Hoover and Iñiguez de Heredia or Reinbold. 
Hoover and Iñiguez de Heredia’s account of moralised politics suggests that rights 
can and almost certainly will clash. Ackerly could respond by arguing that the actors 
identified by Hoover and Iñiguez de Heredia are not actually promoting rights 
enjoyment even though they are (at least at times) using the language of rights, but the 
Hoover and Iñiguez de Heredia position is much more radical. They would, I think, 
reject the view that there are correct and incorrect ways to promote rights, favouring 
instead an analysis that sees rights as always and inherently contested, unavoidably 
ambiguous, necessarily part of politics and bound up with power, and having 
fundamentally different meanings according to the social conditions within which 
which they are invoked. Reinbold, through her depiction of the UDHR as embedded 
within the barbarism of Nazi Germany and the Second World War, but malleable 
enough to stretch across a range of situations which provoke ‘moral outrage’, shows 
that the supposed self-evidence of rights is something which is and must be constantly 
remade.  
 
All contributors, therefore, agree that rights become tangible in practice, even if they 
disagree about the extent to which rights are contextually located and bound. Yet if 
the way to understand rights is through practice, then what is the practice of human 
rights and who are the actors within it? At various points in the articles the authors 
(for ease and succinctness no doubt) treat human rights practice as a coherent whole. 
Yet, as Ackerly acknowledges, any organisation (and in fact any activist) can describe 
their work as rights-based. They are incentivised to do so by the positioning of human 
rights claims in the transcendent centre of international morality, as detailed by 
Reinbold. The sheer number of actors and actions who claim to work in the field of 
human rights (and the sheer number who don’t, but who authors such as Redhead and 
Turnbull and Hoover and Iñiguez de Heredia identify as part of the practice), the 
different roles taken by these actors, the different types of motivations they have and 
the different claims that they make add up to a tremendously complicated field. For 
all that it may be useful to consider the practical politics of human rights, it may be 
that there is no singular practice of human rights at all.  
 
The appeal of studying this field in terms of practice is clear and well-justified in the 
articles, and the literature on the ‘practice turn’ in International Relations is 
burgeoning.1 But the literature is not yet settled on what practices are, nor how to find 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Emanuel Adler (2005) Communitarian International Relations: The epistemic 
foundation of International Relations, London/New York: Routledge; Mervyn Frost (2009) Global 
Ethics, Abingdon/ New York: Routledge;  Iver Neumann (2002) ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic 
Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 31 (3):627-652; Vincent 
Pouliot (2010) International Security in Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and the 
programmes of just about all major international relations conferences over the last two years. Vincent 
Pouliot and Emmanuel Adler’s forthcoming edited collection on International Practices (Cambridge, 
2011) promises to showcase the state of the art in the practice turn.  
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their edges. Practices can be seen as spheres of activity or as types of action, and 
practice theorists approach their studies using Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michael 
Oakeshott, Alasdair MacIntyre, Pierre Bourdieu and even occasionally Charles 
Manning and Hedley Bull.2 These theorists have highly divergent accounts of 
practice, and many methods to identify and study it. An explicit engagement with this 
literature, as started in Redhead and Turnbull’s paper, will be necessary as study of 
the practical politics of human rights progresses. At the same time, some justification 
must be given for where the boundaries of human rights practice are assumed to lie. 
Across the articles in the section, philosophers, theorists, activists, radicals, 
community workers, people in struggle, lawyers, politicians or policy makers and 
bureaucrats are all seen as possible practitioners of human rights. But to assume all of 
these actors, with all of the political positions they take, values they stand for and 
purposes they claim, to be involved in a single sphere of action or to share common-
sense or habitual ways of acting would lose much of the depth and richness that an 
analysis of practice promises. 
 
Ackerly notes, in her first footnote, that human rights advocacy might be thought of as 
a ‘global industry’. It may be that this conceptualisation is a more viable way to study 
the practical politics of human rights, that is, as an industry or field in which there are 
a range of different practices each performed by a range of different actors. 
Fundraising practices, for instance, might differ markedly from international- and 
state level policy making practices (which will also differ across states). Lawyers are 
likely to advocate for human rights in different ways and with different goals than 
Zapatista revolutionaries. And if we broaden the field from advocacy to include the 
entire human rights industry, then the practices of academics who write about rights 
also come into view. An approach which differentiates between practices within an 
industry or field of human rights would also allow exploration of whether and how 
some practices are more sedimented or institutionalised than others – something 
touched upon by Redhead and Turnbull’s analysis, and important if there is thought to 
be benefit in analysing all practices, large and small, which feed into the grand 
international- and state institutional structures built around ideas of rights. 
 
Ackerly sets out a way to evaluate existing practices to establish whether or not they 
do in fact promote human rights enjoyment, with the aim of providing theory that is 
action-guiding, and concludes that only those actors who promote ‘the enjoyment of 
indivisible rights of inter-related humanity, through … challenging not only the rights 
violating behaviour of individual actors but also the social, economic, and political 
barriers to rights enjoyment’ can be said to have a rights-based approach (INSERT 
PAGE REF FROM PROOFS).  A benefit of this approach is to exclude a number of 
actors and organisations who claim to work in the field of human rights from analysis, 
and therefore make the field more manageable to the researcher. Yet the actors 
excluded might include those groups who work on small or single issue areas within 
the field and are not sufficiently inclusive – actors, perhaps, such as those interviewed 
                                                 
2 Cornelia Navari’s recent work sorts through these influences and considers their implications. Navari 
(2010) ‘The Concept of Practice in the English School’, paper presented to International Studies 
Association conference, New Orleans, March;  Navari (2010) ‘Getting from Social Practices to Ethical 
Practices’ SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm, September. The 
Introduction to Vincent Pouliot and Emmanuel Adler’s edited collection on ‘International Practices’ 
(Cambridge, 2011) acknowledges that there is no single theory of practice, but rather a variety of 
theories which focus on practice.  
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by Redhead and Turnbull and identified (quite justifiably in the piece) as involved in 
human rights action. The two articles have different objectives – one to understand 
actors they perceive to be participating in human rights practice, and one to evaluate 
who may be so identified – but each has a valuable goal. Hoover and Iñiguez de 
Heredia muddy the waters even further by including within the field of human rights 
actors who do not acknowledge the moral authority of those rights and who do not use 
the vocabulary of rights, or do so only strategically. This certainly makes the analysis 
of human rights practice a formidable task, both conceptually and methodologically. 
But taking such a broad sweep in defining human rights practice does expose both the 
ubiquity of ideas of rights and, rather unexpectedly, their counter-hegemonic potential 
to foster and support radical change. 
 
The final, but perhaps most profound, questions these articles provoke centre around 
the lack of a call to action from the authors. Doesn’t the argument in the articles entail 
action? Is it not an implication of the arguments presented that as theory and practice, 
the ideal and the practical, are so intimately connected, then there is little point in us 
continuing to write scholarly articles about human rights unless we are also engaged 
in ‘doing’ human rights (even while recognising the risks to activism posed by a 
charge of the theory brigade). Of course, writing is doing in itself – theorising already 
goes some way to constituting the meaning of human rights at any given time. But if 
we are to view human rights as fundamentally about practice, then what, if anything, 
can we usefully say unless we are directly involved in that practice? As Alasdair 
MacIntyre has argued, the way to get out of the theory bunker (and, incidentally, to 
see the range of ethical possibilities available to us beyond the fragmenting and 
contradictory morality of advanced capitalist modernity) is not just to engage with the 
literature of anthropology or sociology or history, but to get involved. He sees ‘[a] 
prior and continuing engagement with a variety of practices and a reflective grasp of 
what’s involved in such engagement’ as necessary to good moral philosophy and 
desires to see on the curriculum vitae of candidates for academic posts in philosophy 
evidence of their ‘relevant experiences on farms and construction sites, in laboratories 
and studios, in soccer teams and string quartets, in political struggles and military 
engagements.’3 The articles collected here accept (to greater and lesser extent) that 
rights mean what they mean according to the practice or practices they are embedded 
or pursued within. But shouldn’t that acceptance lead us, as readers, to require of the 
authors a close engagement with at least some aspects of these practices? Shouldn’t 
we require evidence not just of the analytical abilities of the authors, but also their 
experience on the front line of human rights politics? To do so would require a step 
change in our approach to judging academic arguments, and an acceptance that 
theorists and their work exhibit a complex mix of conviction and abstraction – a mix 
that should be beneficial to the analysis of the political practice of human rights. It is a 
truth (near) universally acknowledged that ‘theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose’, but the recognition of the specific purposes or politics of particular 
theorists, and assessments of theory in light of the practices engaged in by theorists, 
are still some way off. The articles in this section demonstrate why it is necessary; all 
valuable contributions to a vanguard movement seeking innovative ways to explore 
and understand human rights. 
                                                 
3 Alasdair MacIntyre (2009) “On having survived the academic moral philosophy of the twentieth 
century”. Lecture given during meeting of International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry at 
University College of Dubin School of Philosophy, 6-8 March. Available at: 
http://www.ucd.ie/news/2009/03FEB09/110309_macintyre.html
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